Yet as David Uzzell has noted (1998) , this traditional view of heritage interpretation unquestioningly assumes the audience's basic openness to being persuaded. If performed with enough verve and ingenuity, interpretation, it is implied, will have its intended effect. The audience is assumed to be distinct only as individuals, whose "personality and experience" are the targets of interpretation's direct relational appeal. The epistemic content of the interpretation-its view of historical "truth"-is seen as relatively unproblematic, derived from the factual perspectives of historians, architects, and archaeologists. Yet the technique of influencing the heritage public to respond to scientifically-based information with emotion as well as action closely resembles the techniques of public health, environmental, and advertising campaigns (Ham and Weiler, 2003) . Interpretation is seen as an action designed to promote public appreciation for the importance of heritage, its vulnerability, and the necessity for its conservation, as carried out by the official stewards of the locality or the state. But increasingly, heritage is not seen as an undifferentiated resource, nor are its official stewards always regarded as impartial guardians of a shared heritage (Tunbridge and Ashworth, 1996) .
In cases of heritage disputes in zones of ethnic combat or interstate rivalry, a Tildenian conception of "heritage" as an unalloyed good that can be unproblematically interpreted to increase public support for conservation flies in the face of seemingly irreconcilable conflicts over what heritage is significant and how it should be interpreted. Tilden's six principles of interpretation fail to address adequately the challenge of definitively interpreting conflicting perspectives. Among the many examples that could be cited are the contested history of Jerusalem (Silberman, 2001 ), the political controversies over the Kasubi tombs in Uganda (Kigongo and Reid, 2007) , the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan (Colwell-Chanthaphonh, 2003) , the cultural affinities and territorial significance of the Preah Vihear temple on the border of Thailand and Cambodia (Meyer, 2009) , or the conflict between Hindus and Muslims over religious primacy at Ayodhya in India (Bernbeck and Pollock, 1996) . These are only the most famous examples of interpretive conflict, for in our era of "place branding," identity politics, territorial disputes, and tourism-based economics, the control of heritage sites and objects has become a bone of contention between regions, localities, diasporic communities, and nation-states all over the world. Questions of urban renewal, gentrification, demographic dispossession, sovereign claims to the repatriation of plundered or looted relics-and more sensitively-the control of human remains found at archaeological sites all pose even more complex challenges to conventional ideas of conservation and the possibility of a "universal" method of interpretation that will mobilize support for it (Silverman and Ruggles, 2007) . As this chapter will suggest, the changing social, economic, and symbolic value of heritage requires a new theoretical paradigm to replace, or perhaps place in a new context the long cherished concepts of Tilden. Indeed, as Uzzell suggested, heritage interpretation "is stuck in a rut where the how has become more important than the why" (1998:12).
The answer to the "why" question, I believe, lies in heritage interpretation's wider social function-not merely as an effective communication medium, but as a deeper reflection on the rights and proper role of the non-expert public in shaping an ever evolving vision of the past.
From Monologue to Public Participation
Carefully prepared texts and scripts are omnipresent in heritage interpretation-ranging from simple informational panels, to vivid storytelling, to character-based interpretation, visitor centre videos, carefully designed interpretive trails, to elaborate (and costly) virtual environments.
Although the interpretive media in use at various sites may dramatically differ in complexity or sophistication, the process that most of them embody is consistent with the traditional monologual approach: a unidirectional presentation of carefully selected and arranged information derived from an expert source, meant to be accepted by the public as authoritative. Particular interest has been shown for analysis of the cognitive impact of various interpretation programs (e.g. Ham, 2007b) . Through questionnaires, interviews, and tests designed to measure the factual recall and emotional satisfaction of visitors (particularly school children), investigators have begun to analyse what goes on at the other end of the communicative chain. As mentioned above, there is more at stake today than generalized public education and the cultivation of support for conservation. In addition to political issues of identity and ethnic legitimization, public reactions to interpretation have important economic consequences in the so-called "Experience Economy," where heritage sites are often developed as revenue-generating entertainment venues (Silberman, 2007) . The answers to certain questions quite unconnected with historical significance or outstanding universal value can determine whether a ticketed site will succeed or fail: is it fun? Do children as well as adults enjoy it? Was there enough to see and do there? Would you recommend it to friends? With international development agencies encouraging hard-pressed regions to take advantage of their heritage resources as engines of development (Cernea, 2001) , the artful simulation of sanitized authenticity attractive to tourists has often become an end in itself.
It may be useful to examine the processes of interpretation more deeply-both those of the professional interpreters and of the members of the public that interpret what they say. Ablett and Dyer (2009) have proposed the use of hermeneutics-that is, the study of the principles of literary, philosophical, and social interpretation-in order to understand its functioning within the heritage field. Going beyond conceptions of one-way, instrumental communication, of "getting the (scientific) message across," the hermeneutic approach posits two additional interpretive actions that occur simultaneously: 1.) the engagement of the professional interpreter with his/her audience in order to "relate what is being displayed or described to something within the personality or experience of the visitor" (Tilden's first principle); and 2.) the audience members' active efforts from their own perspective to interpret what the interpreter is saying about a particular heritage object or subject-and how it adds, meshes, or clashes with their personal understandings of human nature and history (McIntosh and Prentice 1999) . This is far different from the communications theory perspective, in which the audience is understood as a passive receptor and an interpretive presentation is deemed to be successful when the audience has "correctly" understood what the interpreter was trying to say. It is rather a simultaneous occurrence of two interpretive activities that both have their roots in contemporary social perceptions of class, race, and culture and each has its distinct cognitive significance. Each party to this interaction, both interpreter and listener, tries to fill in the gaps and unspoken assumptions of the other, to call to mind issues of significance that the other has ignored or omitted, and above all, to use both external information and internal interpretation to produce a convincing picture of a particular aspect of historical reality.
Moreover, in each these simultaneous acts of interpretation, the epistemology may be entirely different. For the professional interpreter, the basis for his or her "Authorized Heritage Discourse" (Smith 2006 ) may be the historiographical orientation of aesthetics, nationalism, nostalgia, environmentalism, or chronological progression, seeing time as a sequence of readily identifiable eras, which are linked to narratives of progress, increasing complexity, or alternating flourit and decline (Silberman, 2010) . For any particular visitor or community member, the epistemological and even ontological framework for understanding a heritage site may be different-drawn from unquestioning acceptance of academic authority, ethnic pride or resentment, class consciousness, religious beliefs, folk traditions, or inherited family memoriesseeing the past as an undifferentiated, deep well of experience and symbols of the "once upon a time" (Robb, 1998) . These distinctive modes of interpretation are not exclusive alternatives but are all interwoven components of the complex ideation of socio-cultural life. All have their value. Empirical facts have value in cataloguing, typologising, and evaluating hypotheses. Personal or group attitudes toward certain evocative symbols or associations can offer powerful emotional bases for action and expressions of solidarity. Put simply, public interpretation can be an activity where all these distinct modes of cognition are encouraged to be openly expressed and reveal themselves to each other, each enriching all the others with unexpected understandings and insights about the significance and value of heritage.
Heritage and the Public Sphere
Where should such dialogues-or "polylogues"-of differing sources of information and conceptions of value take place? During a tour? Outside the site? At home? In public planning meetings? On historical TV documentaries or in special-interest internet sites? In discussions of historical novels, films, or video games? I would suggest that we look beyond the sequestered world of official commemoration techniques and administration to consider heritage interpretation to be a profoundly important public activity. Its place in public discourse is no less important than other debates about social policy, development issues, or immigration restrictions-all of them based on an evolving consensus of past, present or future "national character." For if cultural heritage is indeed "unique and irreplaceable property" of great importance "for all the peoples of the world" (UNESCO 1972: preamble) , it should be a serious subject for informed debate and reflection in the public sphere.
By "public sphere" I mean a place of popular deliberation, not to be confused either with the public institutions of government or public places like parks, highways, or sidewalks where there is rarely organized discussion of important issues-except in times of demonstrations and protests, where those who see themselves as ignored or aggrieved make their angry voices heard. The public sphere is that arena of debate and discussion where ideas and perspectives are exchanged and consensuses arrived at between nominal equals-the most basic constitution of democracy. In this, I follow the social philosopher and political theorist Jürgen
Habermas, who has recognized the importance of the public sphere as a place of democratic deliberation and has traced its history from the Middle Ages to the present day (Habermas, 1991; Calhoun, 1992 ; and for a good general introduction: Goode, 2005). I would suggest that Habermas's historical analysis has great relevance for heritage interpretation and heritage practice in general, as it is interwoven both in the physical monuments of "officialized" public representation and in the ways in which the public relates to them.
For Habermas, the great monumental ecclesiastical and royal structures (some of which that comprise early inscriptions to the World Heritage List) represent a public sphere in which there was no discussion, but rather faced the mass of subjects with ideological "shock and awe." Power and powerlessness were quite clear cut; the justification of power was inscribed on the landscape in those monumental forms. Then, according to Habermas, in the early modern period, with the gradual disintegration of the absolutist state and the rise of a "middle class" of economically entrepreneurial merchants, and eventually manufacturers, a new kind of public sphere arose (Habermas, 1991: 14-24) . In the smoky urban coffee shops, scientific societies, literary journals, and in the pages of newspapers and other novel journalistic publications of the bourgeois intelligentsia of the Age of Enlightenment, a new kind of public sphere arose.
Neither part of the State, nor private possession of any individual, this widely dispersed, mediated conversation offered a forum for free and often spirited debate and discussion on important matters of the day, on evolving technologies and their social and economic impacts, on visions of the future, and shared creative expressions of identity and political philosophy thatat least in Habermas's initial estimation-prepared the ground for the first modern Western deliberative democracies. In time, however, the very qualities that Habermas most prized in this first modern public sphere-namely the ability of individuals to participate in its free-flowing discourse, without the quality or power of their ideas to be directly linked to their social rank-was transformed and eventually extinguished with subsequent political developments (Habermas, 1991: 181-220 ). Put briefly, as the absolute state withered away to be replaced by the bureaucratic nation-state in the late eighteenth century, the voluntary public sphere of deliberative discourse was transformed into the formalized structures of representative democracy, with the public deputizing fulltime parliament members to carry on the public deliberations for them. And finally, according to Habermas, with the decline of widespread public engagement in political discourse and the rise of consumer oriented societies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, representative democracy became largely procedural, with the voting public choosing between competing candidates as they might choose between competing consumer products. Advertising, public relations, and subtle appeals to emotions and to personal fears and biases brought on what Habermas considered a period of re-feudalization in which the "public sphere" evaporated. The public passively consumed (like they consumed other mass-produced products) the legitimizing self-representations of economic and political elites.
My purpose in bringing up the Habermasian idea of the "public sphere" is not so much to testify to its historical accuracy or to its contemporary political implications as to note how the extent of public debate and discussion in particular periods may have a far-reaching effect on the functioning of a democratic society. More than that: the withering of public participation in deliberation on important issues of collective identity, policy, and planning leaves power almost entirely in the hands of vested interests and technocratic "expertise" (on this issue, see also Scott, 1999 and Mitchell, 2002) What makes this heuristic model of the public sphere especially relevant to heritage interpretation is that a similar trajectory of public participation seems can to be evident in the history of official heritage. From an initial stage of statist self-legitimation through the designation of national shrines and monuments to a presumably compliant citizenry (e.g. Dietler, 1994 among many other examples), came a period in which a non-governmental "public sphere" emerged, devoted to learned, reflective discussion of the ethics and philosophy of conservation and commemoration. The leading figures, including Ruskin, Viollet le Duc and somewhat later Riegl, were based in architecture and academia, rather than being direct spokesmen of the government (Jokilehto, 1986) . Without unduly emphasizing this similarity of trajectory to that of Habermas, it might also be said that the following period was one of governmentalisation-a kind of representative regime in which functionaries in government ministries and bureaucratic departments enacted the scholarly consensus through the fashioning of legislation and adopting certain criteria of value and conservation practices (Fowler, 1987; Delafons, 1997; Kohl, 1998) . This can be seen especially in the twentieth century with the regularization of antiqui-ties and monument services and the formulation of international charters and conventions that enshrined expert opinion as authoritative.
Lastly, and more recently, with the neoliberal wave of economic restructuring throughout the world, heritage has become an increasingly commodified resource. As "driver of development" it must increasingly lure visitors with extravagant site design and entertaining multimedia attractions. In most cases in the "Experience Economy" the heritage client does not contribute to the formulation of national memory or the determination of social significance except by passively choosing the sites to visit and thereby boosting their international visibility and revenue (Hewison, 1987; Lowenthal, 2002; Outka, 2009) Why is this narrative of particular relevance to heritage interpretation? It is relevant because it traces the degree and extent of fundamental interaction between the public and "heritage," not merely the effectiveness of information transfer to them. Indeed the most important element of Habermas's analysis of the public sphere and his later classic discussion of communicative action in society is that the greater the sphere of discussion, debate, and the possibility of consensus building, the greater the legitimacy the collective will possess. And at a time when conflicts of heritage values were becoming increasingly evident-and they were being answered primarily by technologies of ever more powerful one-way communication and ever more superficial and passive consumption, it was clear that the basic theory and method of heritage interpretation inherited from Freeman Tilden needed to be thoroughly rethought.
Interpretation as Process Not Product
The policy initiative that led to the formulation and eventual ratification of the ICOMOS Charter on the Interpretation and Presentation of Cultural Heritage Sites (ICIP, 2008) emerged at a time when the digital technologies-particularly visualization and interactive multimedia applications-were becoming recognized as the cutting edge in interpretive outreach (Addison, 2001; Arnold et al., 2008; Kalay, 2008) . It was also a time when the Burra Charter (ICOMOS Australia, 1999) and other policy documents like the Council of Europe's "Faro" Framework Convention (Council of Europe, 2005) were establishing the principle of public rights and responsibilities in the conservation and interpretation of heritage sites. These two elements-the increased and far more powerful dissemination of heritage information and the enhanced role of all stakeholders in creating as well as consuming it, created the conditions for a new approach to interpretation within wide sectors of the international heritage community.
Up to that time, the focus on public communication within ICOMOS and other international heritage organizations had been rather vaguely defined by a variety of terms including "presentation," "interpretation," "popularisation," "public education," "outreach," and even "vulgarisation," (ICIP, 2008: Preamble) that all implicitly retained the idea of one-way communication with the non-expert public from a privileged source of authority. Increasingly, the worldwide neoliberal economic restructuring was requiring heritage places to become selfsufficient; the source of "authority" was becoming a demand for revenue generation through tourism. The new digital technologies all too often were used to attract visitors through novel and entertaining presentations, often of questionable value for reflecting upon or even learning about the past (e.g. Krösbacher and Ruddy, 2006) . The result was an attempt to reach an international consensus on a new code of practice for interpretation at cultural heritage sites.
The ICOMOS Interpretation Charter attempted to facilitate wider collaboration between communities, interested individuals, and heritage professionals in the planning, expression, and continuing revision of interpretation-taking full cognisance of the new technologies as well as the new imperative of community accountability. Thus widened access, diversified information sources, inclusiveness in content, planning for sustainability, and public participation in economic benefit were among the central principles of the Charter.
3 Its aim was to replace the exclusive authority of the professional interpreter with a collaboration of stakeholders, including new people, new voices, and new themes into the interpretive discourse. Professional interpreters would, of course, not disappear from the heritage landscape, but their emphasis would be primarily on the transfer of empirical information-or even the emotional "provocation" to elicit interest and support outlined by Tilden. It was rather the engagement of local and associated communities in interpretation as expressions of local and regional identity and empowerment as participants in collective reflection.
Innovative programmes framing heritage as a platform for contemporary debate and discussion had proved successful at contested sites and "sites of conscience" (Sevcenko, 2002; Malan, 2008) , but here the aim was more general-to widen heritage interpretation of all sites from a transmission of specialised knowledge by specially trained interpreters to places of the (re)creation of collective memory in which many perspectives, subjectivities, identities and values could be freely exchanged. In our mediated, consumption-oriented era, sites of heritage have all too often become themed places of entertainment, with nostalgia as their chief commodity. And it was a kind of impossible restorative nostalgia, in which the visitor, in an unwitting acceptance of von Ranke's historical essentialism, came to see the past "as it really was" (Rüsen, 1990) . The Charter-and the paradigm of heritage interpretation it embodies-does not merely assume that the tangible and intangible inheritance from past generations has an unambiguous, self-evident significance. They are seen instead as "vessels of value" (Araoz, 2011) in which the values they contain sometimes clash, combine, evolve, or are newly created through the experiences and perspectives of members of contemporary society.
Interpretation as Public Discourse
The 2008 Heritage interpretation is becoming performative rather than strictly didactic; the lecture and the museum exhibit now stand on an equal footing with the historical reflections and ever-renewing performative self-representations of hybrid memory communities .
This sense of identity and community cannot be imposed through outside instruction, nor can a body of value-neutral facts, dates, and figures, conveyed by a specialised interpreter provoke and inspire visitors or local residents to see heritage sites as "vessels of value" and that are more than just statically conserved relics. Interpretation must abandon a purely curatorial perspective to recognize-in the words of the novelist William Faulkner-that "the past is never dead. It's not even past" (Faulkner, 1959) . Collaboration in the development, design, and in- 1) Any interpretation that does not somehow relate what is being displayed or described to something within the personality or experience of the visitor will be sterile.
2) Information, as such, is not Interpretation. Interpretation is revelation based on information. But they are entirely different things. However, all interpretation includes information.
3) Interpretation is an art, which combines many arts, whether the materials presented are scientific, historical, or architectural. Any art is to some degree teachable.
4) The chief aim of Interpretation is not instruction, but provocation.
5) Interpretation should aim to present a whole rather than a part, and must address itself to the whole person rather than any phase.
6) Interpretation addressed to children (say, up to the age of twelve) should not be a dilution of the presentation to adults, but should follow a fundamentally different approach. To be at its best it will require a separate program. 
